Approved For Release 0.03/05 EGR 1579T09975A004400460001-2

6 May 1959

Copy No. C 62

## CENTRAL

# INTELLIGENCE

## BULLETIN



DOGUMENT NO.

NO CHANGE IN CLASS.

DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TO 2 5 LO

NEXT REVIEW DATE:

AUTH: 148 199

State Dept. review completed

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T009754004400460001-2 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 6 May 1959 25X1 25X1 DAILY BRIEF II. ASIA-AFRICA Jordan: Premier-designate Hazza Majalli has formed a new cabinet following the resignation of Premier Rifai on 5 May. The King's designation of Majalli appears to tie the 25X1 King more closely to the militant Bedouin minority which dominates the army, the monarchy's principal support. Majalli, Ta British protege, who briefly served as premier during the unsuccessful attempt to take Jordan into the Baghdad Pact in December 1955, is related to some of the Bedouin army officers who have intrigued against Army Chief of Staff Shara and Rifai. Husayn's support of the Bedouin may alienate vociferous segments of the population, and open the way for resumption of instability in the government and army which was chronic before Rifai took over the leadership in the spring of 1957. 25X1 i

Approved For Release 2003/03/10: CIA-RDP79T00975A004400460001-2

| www          |  |    |   |   |   |   |                    |
|--------------|--|----|---|---|---|---|--------------------|
| 25 <b>X1</b> |  |    | Approved For  | Release 2003/03/10 : 0  | CIA-RDP79T0097  | 50004400460001-2  |                    |
|              |  | 40 | tanks and (<br>the British<br>Communist<br>trade ties   | On 3 May, the Bri<br>condon's decision to<br>Canberra bombers.<br>expectations that<br>t control, keep oil f<br>with Britain. Qasin<br>linguess to sell arm | sell Iraq arm The ambassa Iraq would re lowing to Euro m seemed gen | s including ador reiterated main free of ope, and improve uinely pleased by | 25 <b>X1</b>       |
|              |  |    | of New Jer  | Libya may soon of<br>latest discovery we<br>sey, located 200 m<br>f more than 2,400 b   | ell by Standar<br>iles south of E                                   | d Oil Company<br>Bengasi, tested  | ı<br>25 <b>X</b> 1 |
| 25 <b>X1</b> |  |    | multip others   | Liby<br>Middle East crude.  |   | e highly competitive  | 25X1<br>           |
| 25 <b>X1</b> |  |    | Malaye  | a: Recent Chinese-  | Malay riots or  | an island off the   |                    |
| 25 <b>X1</b> |  | OK | Malayan co<br>in the Fede<br>develop on<br>ing the stat | ast highlight the secration of Malaya. C<br>the mainland as a r<br>te and federal electi  | rious underlyi<br>ommunal diso<br>result of politi<br>ion campaigns | ing racial tensions rders could also cal agitation dur- now under way.      |                    |
|              |  |    | 6 May 59  | DAILY   | BRIEF   | ii  |                    |

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400460001-2

25X

25X1

### IV. CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB COMMITTEE ON BERLIN SITUATION

The USIB has taken note of the following conclusions reached by its special committee on the Berlin situation. The committee pointed out that its conclusions were to be used in context with SNIE 100-2-59 (24 February 1959) and with the review of that estimate in SNIE 100-2/1-59 (17 March 1959):

1. The USSR appears to be concentrating more on the issue of West Berlin in anticipation that this rather than the question of a peace treaty will be its strongest card at the Geneva foreign ministers' meeting. However, there are indications that the USSR will attempt to have the West discuss the draft Soviet peace treaty for Germany paragraph by paragraph.

Soviet propaganda media are attempting to undercut the Western concept of an indissoluble package on reunification, European security, disarmament, and Berlin before the talks begin, to divide the Allies, to build pressures on Western governments to move toward Soviet positions, and to prepare the ground for blaming the West for any failure to reach agreement.

- 2. Debate in the French National Assembly provided a strong demonstration of support for De Gaulle's position on Berlin and related German questions.
- 3. The May Day Freedom rally in West Berlin, with an estimated crowd of at least half a million--as large or larger than those led by Reuter during the 1948 blockade-indicates morale in West Berlin remains strong. There were no significant changes in West Berlin's economic situation.
- 4. While it is highly improbable that the USSR will turn over access controls to the GDR unless there is a

Approved For Release 2003/03/10: CIA-RDP79T00975A0044Q0460001-2

OK

iii

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400460001-2

breakdown in East-West negotiations, the physical transfer could be accomplished with little or no warning.

5. There are no reliable indications of a bloc intent in the near future to blockade Allied or West German access to West Berlin, or to seal off West Berlin from the bloc. However, the USSR could take such actions with little or no warning.

25X1

#### THE COMMUNIST BLOC No Back-up Material

#### TT. ASIA-AFRICA

#### Hazza Majalli Forms New Jordanian Cabinet

Premier-designate Hazza Majalli has formed a new cabinet, following the resignation of Premier Rifai on 5 May for reasons of "health." The new cabinet was scheduled to be sworn in on the morning of 6 May. (Although the 60-year-old Rifai endured three mild heart attacks during the last year, his resignation actually was intended as a maneuver to obtain the King's reaffirmation of his authority, including the premier's support of Army Chief of Staff Major General Sadiq Shara. Shara had been accused by Bedouin army officers of plotting against the monarchy. Rifai had also been at odds with the 'palace 25X1 clique," which has long sought his replacement. He had been premier since May 1958; he was de facto government strongman for the year before that as deputy premier to ailing Ibrahim Hashim.

The King's selection of Majalli would appear to commit the King more closely than ever to the militant Bedouin minority whose domination of the army has ensured the monarchy's surviv-The Bedouin number about 300,000 out of Jordan's total population of 1,500,000. Among the Bedouin, the officers of the Bani Sakhr tribe form the most potent bloc. This group, during Husayn's absence on his world tour, further enhanced its position through accusation and arrest of members of a rival officer clique from northern Jordan--the maneuver which led to the resignation of Rifai.

Hazza Majalli, /a former British protege who served briefly as premier in December 1955 during the unsuccessful attempt to take Jordan into the Baghdad Pact, is distantly related to the

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10: CIA-RDP79T00975A004400460001-2 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 6 May 59 Page 1 prominent Bedouin officers of the Majalli family in the Bani Sakhr tribe, who led the intrigues against Shara and Rifai. He has in the past had fairly good relations with the pro-UAR, ultranationalist National Socialist party, and this might improve the prospects for a normalization of relations with the UAR. Unless some accommodation to the nationalist view is made, Husayn's decision to go along with the Bedouin in this instance could narrow further the basis of the monarchy's support in Jordan. It might thus open the way for a resumption of instability in the government and army which was chronic before

Rifai took over government leadership.

25X1

25X1

25X1


#### American Embassy Assessment of Iraqi Situation

Developments in Iraq during the past five weeks lead the US Embassy to conclude that the drift toward a Communist state is continuing at a steady rate. Ambassador Jernegan now feels that Premier Qasim is the only possible force in Iraq capable of turning the government away from its leftward course.

Qasim said on 3 May that Britain's agreement to sell Iraq heavy military equipment was a "new page turned in British-Iraqi relations" and reiterated that his government intends to remain "free of both East and West." Both Qasim and anti-Communist Foreign Minister Jawad have told the American ambassador within the past week that Iraq would not "go Communist."

By and large, however, strong anti-Communists have been liquidated by arrests, purges, and forced retirements. Real control of the army appears to be in the hands of pro-Communists and political neutrals, and members of the Communist party will probably be included in the cabinet soon. The Communist-controlled Popular Resistance Forces are growing both in size and effectiveness; Communist-directed mass organizations, having received at least an indirect blessing from Qasim, are continuing to expand. The Communists already control the propaganda media, are consolidating their control over the educational system, and are maneuvering to bring the economy under the control of a Soviet-model planning system.

25X1



14. 2.

1 13.69

25X1

and the state of the contract of the contract

#### Libya's Oil Prospects Become Increasingly More Favorable

Discoveries in Libya during the past 18 months have indicated the presence of oil in commercial quantities. Libya awarded its first concession on 20 November 1955.

Seven successful wells have been drilled thus far: three along the western border near French Sahara and Tunisia and four located 50 to 100 miles south of the Gulf of Sirte. One of these four drilled by Standard Oil Company (N. J.) tested at more than 2,400 barrels per day.

25X1

The other three important discoveries have been made in this area by the Oasis Oil Company, which brought in three promising wells less than 75 miles south of the Gulf of Sirte. Together, they have an estimated potential of 2,200 barrels per day. Additional drilling is under way to determine the extent of the fields.

Since 1955 most of the major international oil companies have acquired concessions in Libya, but earlier hopes that substantial quantities of oil would be quickly discovered in western Libya near the French Saharan fields have faded somewhat. Despite the Libyan prohibition against companies owned or controlled by foreign governments, British Petroleum and Cie. Francaise des Petroles, both largely government owned, have been granted concessions. Thus far the foreign-government provision has been invoked only against the Italian firm Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi.

| Libyan oil could be highly competitive wit    | h other Middle East |
|---|---------------------|
| crude since it is closer to European markets. |                     |
|   |                     |
|   |                     |
|   |                     |
|   |                     |

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400460001-2
6 May 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4

#### Riots in Malaya Underscore Racial Tensions

The Malayan Government's concern over racial tensions is reflected in Prime Minister Abdul Razak's hurried visit on 3 May to the scene of the Malay-Chinese communal riots on Pangkor Island about 100 miles northwest of Kuala Lumpur. Further indications of this concern were the government's efforts to suppress the news and later to play down the racial aspects of the riots.

The trouble apparently began on 1 May when a Malay molested a Chinese girl. The subsequent riot spread rapidly and, according to press reports, soon involved nearly all of the island's 3,000 inhabitants. One person was killed and ten injured. The situation was finally brought under control by 200 police reinforcements, including a special riot squad.

The incident highlights the serious underlying racial tensions in Malaya, where 37 percent of the population is Chinese. These tensions are likely to increase as a result of political agitation during the current campaigns for the state elections in May and June and the federal elections in August. Widespread disorders could destroy the ruling multiracial Alliance party and with it the concept of Malay-Chinese political cooperation upon which stability in Malaya depends.

|   | $\mathbf{T}\mathbf{h}$ | e last | serious | riots in | Malayat | ook place | in N | ovember |
|---|------------------------|--------|---------|----------|---------|-----------|------|---------|
|   | 1957.                  |        |         |          | -       |           |      |         |
| Г | L                      |        |         |          |         |           |      |         |
| ı |                        |        |         |          |         |           |      |         |
| ١ |                        |        |         |          |         |           |      |         |
| ١ |                        |        |         |          |         |           |      |         |
|   |                        |        |         |          |         |           |      |         |

25X1

25X1

#### Approved For Release 2003/03/10: CIA-RDP79T00975A004400460001-2

#### THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior

The Secretary of the Interior

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

**Atomic Energy Commission** 

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

United States Information Agency

The Director

Approved For Release 2008 (P): (S) POPR 1975A004400460001-2